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Thetheory of demand for insurance has been studied by Arrow
(1963, 1973a,b), Mossin (1968), Smith (1968), Pratt (1964), Ehrlich
and Becker (1973; hereafter EB), and others;.and demand estimates
have been published by Fuchs and Kramer (1972), Feldstein
(1973), and Phelps (1973). These works have generally specified
insurance contracts in which (1) the losses are not affected by the
amount of insurance (EB is an exception), or (2) the amount of
insurance in each period can be chosen directly. I will investigate
here demand for insurance under two more restrictive conditions
that normally apply to health insurance: (1) the insurance coverage
rate must be equal in all insured states of the world (i.e., constant
coinsurance in all insured states) and (2) states of the world are
aggregated in some fashion before a loading fee is computed.
I assume that the consumer has a utility function in a composite
good (x) and health (H), where health is produced by medical care
(/i) and own-time in fixed production coefficients, and where the
stock of health H is subject to random losses ("illnesses") having a
known distributionf(l), where 1 is the illness amount. Hence, the
final level of health is H0 —1+ g(h), where H0 is the endowed level
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I.ofhealth. To capture the essence of the model I assume that the where (1 —(
consumer may choose only some coinsurance rate C (the fraction of plan. Optin
medical care bills paid by the consumer) and a maximum payment derivatives
amount h* (in units of care). The insurance isa subsidy for to C and h
purchasing medical care, so calculating the optimal values of C and constraints
h* must take into account that more h is purchased for lower values
4 — ofC (Phelps, 1973; Phelps and Newhouse, 1974).
) s0(R,.)X
The consumer pays for his insurance with a premium, R, that
reflects both the expected expenses for medical care and adminis-
trative costs of the insurance process. Several specifications of the and
insurance premium will be investigated to examine differential
effects of different pricing systems on demand for insurance. (5) so(—Rh*)
In addition, effects of income, and of income tax subsidy of
insurance, will be investigated. It can be shown that estimates of
the income elasticity of demand for insurance include (1) a "pure"
income effect and (2) a substitution effect that depends on the where .R,. a
progressiveness of income taxes. Estimated income elasticities of and h*, res
demand for insurance caii be separated into these components. the health
Finally, I will investigate effects of changes in the price level of Expressi
medical care. It has been asserted that rising prices for medical care that used b
induce additional demand for insurance (Feldstein, 1971). This all states r
model shows that that conclusion does not hold except under premium
specific circumstances. larger loss
The model to be used assumes that consumers maximize ex- still chang
pected utility over all possible states of illness. The distribution of tional rate
illnessesf(l) is assumed to be continuous and smooth in the range than j*• TF
o 1<co.Thus,expected utility can be written as Rh./[Rhs
ci' ratesbetw
(1) Z =s0U(x0,Ho)+JU[x,Ho — I +g(h)]f(j)dI solved for
+fU[x,H0 —I +g(h)Jf(l)dl
(6)Ph.=—
whereis the loss that induces the consumer to purchase h* units (1-
of care,' and where
The optiff
so + 5 f(I)dl 1 utility of ii
insurance-
For 11*, the budget constraint is: 1ancimore
(2) 1 =x +Cphh +R lern analy
possible s
reflecting the insurance subsidy for medical care. choice of
For the second integral, in which insurance no longer pays, the
budget constraint is: loading
(3) 1 =x+ p0h + R —(1_C)p,h* where
116 Phelps 117 Dessume that the where (1 _C)phh* is the maximum amount paid by the insurance
(the fraction of plan. Optimal levels of C and h* are derived by solving the first
imum payment derivatives when set to zero. When Zisdifferentiated with respect
a subsidy for to C and h* and set to zero subject to the appropriate budget
values of C and constraints (2) and (3), the results are:2
or lower values
(4) 80(—Re)A(10) + [—R.—Phh(l)]f(1)dl
emium,R, that
e and adminis- + x(1)(—R.—p,,h*)f(1)dl=0
fIcations of the and
differential
nsurance. (5) So(—Rh.).X(10)+f(—Rh.) .X(1)f(1)dl
tax subsidy of
at estimates of
+f[—Ri,. ÷ (1 —C)ph] X(t)f(l)dl =0
de (1) a "pure"
1
epends on the where R(. and Rh. are the partial derivatives of R with respect to C
elasticities of and h*, respectively, and X(l) is the marginal utility of income for
,omponents. the health loss 1.
eprice level of Expressions (4) and (5) are subject to an interpretation parallel to
or medical care that used by EB. In (5), if h* increases, the net income flow out of
n, 1971). This all states more favorable than h* is —Rn., the derivative of the
except under premium as h* changes. For states less favorable than 1* (i.e.,
larger losses), the net income transfer rate is —Rh. (the premium
maximize ex- still changes) plus (1 —C)ph, the last expression reflecting the addi-
distribution of , tionalrate of income flow into those states with illnesses greater
th in the range than 1*. The real price of insurance, defined in the EB sense, is
Rn*/[—Rh. + thenegative of the ratio of income flow
rates between states below and above h*. Equation (5) can be
solved for this price, showing
(6) = — Rh. = A(l)f(1)dl =U'
irchase h* units (1 —Rh.
s0X(lo) +fA(1)f(l)dl
The optimal h* is chosen so that the ratio of expected marginal
utility of incomes above and below h* is equal to the real price of
insurance—the ratio of income transfers between less favorable
and more favorable states. This is analogous to the two-state prob-
lem analyzed by EB, except that here the consumer divides all
possible states of nature into two categories on the basis of his
1 choiceof h*. mger pays, tne . . . . Itis possible to show that some insurance is optimal with the
loading fee sufficiently small. To prove this point, notice that
where
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no insuran R=f(1 —C)p,,hf(1)dl + (1 _C)p,h*f(1)dl
right-hand





Then to show that some h* >0 is optimal, I evaluate (5) at h* =0. expected 1
Atthat point, (5) becomes As seen
rate into at
(7a) —s)A(1)(1 _C)p,Q(1*)+f [(1 —C)p,, —(1_C)p,Q(1*)]f(1)dl states") th
1* such ={_s)x(1)Q(1*)+ (1 _Q(1*)] }(1—C)p,, income fic
where (1 —s0)X=5X(1)f(l)dl is expected marginal utility for all income fic
1" is (—Re: states of the world with losses. Notice that for I =0,Q(l) =1—s0, serious so (7a) becomes tive, the i
(7b) [— —si)) + X(1 —s4))(so)] (1 —C)p1, sumerdoe
only one
= — X(10)](1 —C)p,s(1 —s4) >0 ëomes ac
from the c
since X(10), the marginal utility of income with no loss, is less ial case of
than X(I) for any larger I. (A loss, I, can be translated into an is difficul
income loss, so that t9AJOI>0.)Thus for "small" 6, some purchase show beh
of insurance is optimal. 1, the con
It also follows that some loading fee of sufficient size exists how Pi cF
to deter purchase. Let the premium function be R =(1+O)E(bene- change b
fits), where 0 is the load. Then Rh. and







—s0X(10X1+ 0)(1 —s0) +(l—s0)A[1 —(1+6)(1 —Se)]} Forthis
because
=(1—C)p,(1 —s0) 1so(1 +0) [X—X(10)] _Qx} function






That is, if the loading fee ath* =0exceeds the difference between
marginal utilities of income in the states with and without loss Clearly,
(relative to their expectation), times the probability of no loss, then For 11*
118 Phelps 119 Iate (5) at h*0.
(1*)] f(1)dl











•y of no loss, then
-I
no insurance will be purchased. Notice the similarity between the
right-hand-side of (9) and the usual risk-aversion measure.
The problem with respect to choice of C is more complex and is
in fact the major difference between choice of single-coverage
reimbursement insurance and other forms of insurance. The con-
sumer must select one level of coinsurance C that maximizes
expected utility over all possible insured states.
As seen from Equation (10) is negative. The income flow
rate into any state withl is (phh + Re). For small losses ("favorable
states") the flow rate is negative. There is some loss 1 between 0 and
1* such that the net income flow is zero.3 For larger losses, the net
income flow is positive, including those forl in which case the
income flow rate is (phh* + Re). The "real price of insurance for state
1" is (1) + Re), the ratio of income transfers from the least
serious state (h =0) to the more serious states. If this "price" is nega-
tive, the income flow is away from that state. Notice that the con-
sumer does not choose some income transfer for each state, but rather
only one value for C. Hence, he is really not directly allocating in-
comes according to the prices in each state; that allocation follows
from the choice of C and from his choice of h given!. Only for the triv-
ial case ofh =hfor all! is a direct solution of(4) possible. Thus, it
is difficult to speak of "the price of C" in the usual sense. I shall
show below that where P1—RC/[phh (1) + Re], the price of C for loss
1, the comparative statics of demand for C will hinge cnicially on
howchanges with 1. Since changes in income or medical prices
change both R (and hence and h(l); an income-generated
own-price effect on demand for care may translate into a modified
price effect of demand for insurance. I will show that if P, increases
with 1 (for whatever reason), then demand for C falls commensu-
rately. It is by this method that comparative statics of demand forC
may be analyzed. It can be shown also that some insurance is
optimal (i.e., C <1) for a sufficiently small loading fee and small s0.
For this proof, I make the simplifying assumption that h* =
becausethis simplifies the calculation of the premium change
function Rr. In general, the premium function is
so
R =(1+O)[101*(1—C)p,h (l)f(1)dl + (1 —C)p,M*f(1)dl]
(10) —R(.=(1+ 0) {f"
h(1)[C -(1 f(l)dl +
Clearly,at 6 =0and atC1, this becomes —R( = + p,h*Q(1*).
Forh* = —Re=p,h,the average expense in states with positive
119 DemandforReimbursement Insuranceappropriat( illness, where h is a function of1, and C, but is evaluated at
C =1.Expression (4), showing how expected utility changes with I sent any in
C, can be evaluated at C =itodetermine if E(U) rises or falls with
iS
C—if it falls (dZ/dC <0), then some insurance purchase is optimal. d —
Expression(4), using the above substitution for —R(., becomes
Z ——k
(11)
—f + which mus
Hence
= X(10) -fx(1) {h (1) -h]f(l)dl
The expression in the integral is positive; if X(l) were constant over (13)dh*IdX =
alllosses, then the integral would merely be the integral of
deviations of h(l) about its mean; but each value is weighted by x(l), The deno
which increases as 1 increases. Thus the larger terms in the integral condition
(recall that h (1) increases with 1) carry a larger weight, and the expected i
integral itself is positive. Therefore, (ii) is negative for a suffi- to the sign
ciently small value of s0,orif the marginal utility of income rises tive of (5)'
sufficiently between the state with no lossand all other states, comparati'
which means that E(U) will rise if C is reduced from 1 to some taken.
smaller value—some insurance is purchased.
' dC -
Whenselecting C less than 1, the model shows that the larger the (14) =
coinsuranceelasticity of demand for h, the larger will be the
optimal coinsurance level. Optimal C is chosen so that for any The ba
smaller C, expected utility (Z) falls; in other words, dZ/dC becomes
positive, which can happen only if grows "large" relative to the
o2z averageexpense p,,h. From (10), —R(. obviously becomes large as (15)
either0 increases or as increases in absolute value. If Th(• is oh 01
sufficiently large, the optimal C could be near
—f
1'
Oneprediction that might be made informally from this model is —Jo
that the equilibrium coinsurance rate (ceteris paribus) will be
h larger (less insurance), the larger the own-price elasticity of de-





1.COMPARATIVE STATICS OF DEMAND FOR incomes)
MAXIMUMCOVERAGE , coverage
First, I will analyze effects of income, medical prices, and various with




The comparative statics are developed by fully differentiating the sions api













•ve for a suffi-
f income rises
11 other states,














appropriate derivative. Let ÔZrepresentEquation (5) and X repre-
sent any independent variable of interest. Then the full derivative
is
(12)dz =—ô(OZ)dx + dh*
ox Oh"





The denominator of this expression is simply the second-order
condition for optimality with respect to h*_it must be negative if
expected utility is maximized.5 Thus the sign of dC/dX is identical
to the sign of the cross-partial derivative 02Z/OC OX; i.e., the deriva-
tive of (5) with respect to X. A similar result holds, of course, for the









where r(I,1) is the Arrow-Pratt risk-aversion measure, defined as
r(I,l) =—02U/012/OU/OI=—(t3VOI)/X.Equation (15) is obviously
just the negative of the first-order condition (5) weighted by the
risk-aversion measure. If the person exhibits constant risk aversion
over all illness levels (equivalent to constant risk aversion over all
incomes), then this "income effect" on demand for maximum
coverage is zero. If risk aversion increases with illnesses (decreases
with income), then r(I,1) acts as a weighting scheme making (15)
negative, so that demand forh* falls as income rises. If risk aversion
is increasing in income (decreasing as illnesses increase), then (15)
becomes positive and demand forh* increases as income increases.
This "basic income effect" appears throughout the comparative
statics of demand for reimbursement insurance. Invariably, expres-
sions appear where an income effect is present, based on how the
121 Demand for Reimbursement Insurancemarginal utility of income (X(l)) changes as some variable, X,
changes. The income iii these derivatives is always deter-
mined by how OX/OX changes over values of 1. Hence, it is sufficient
to determine the behavior of 0 AJOXover1 in order to determine the
"income component" of effects of any variable, X, on demand.
MedicalPrices
Inaddition to the pure income effects, this model can show the
effects of a change in PhOfldemand for maximum coverage. The
income effect of a change in Phisdetermined by the behavior of






which(in elasticity form) becomes the "weights" in the integral




x(1) ÔPh — + )r"(1) +[o,, + (1 —C)p,,h *Jm,,
for h>h*
whereisthe out-of-pocket budget share—i.e., Cphh/I for hh 'K,
and[ph(h —h *) + Cphh *]/J for h > h 'K,iihl is the income elasticity
of demand for h, is the total elasticity of the premium R with
respect to p,. and Wfiisthe budget share of R itself.
Although this income effect appears complex, its sign is basically
determined by whether r*(l)_the income elasticity of the mar-
ginal utility of income—is larger or smaller than the income
elasticity of demand for medical care.7 The factors are offsetting—
when medical prices rise, the income effect inducesdemand
for higher coverage, but general purchasing power falls com-
mensurately, tending to reduce demand for h*. Empirical esti-
mates of r*(I) are in the range of 1.5 to 2.5, whereas estimates
of arein the range of 0.1 to 0.5, so the general income effect is
likely to dominate the income effect of demand for h.
Several things are worth remembering about this phenomenon.
First, if C is small (nearly zero coinsurance), then the budget
share terms 0htendto vanish in (17), but oRwillbe larger. Thus
at one extrer
would





































123 Dee variable, X,
always deter- at one extreme (low C, low nh,),onlythe terms involving
itis sufficient would remain, which are negative. In this case, the income effect
determine the of a change inwould be negative—higher Ph would mean lower
n demand. h*. At another extreiTle, if nRphisnear zero—as would occur if de-
mand for medical care were nearly of unitary elasticity—and if C
were near zero, then only the final term (1 wouldre-
main in the last i'.tegral, which is positive. In this case, demand
for h* would risep, increased, via this income effect. Thus
it appears that the.are interactions between demand for C and
can show the h*, and even interactions between demand for h* and demand for
coverage. The h. The resultant derivatives are, however, ambiguous.
he behavior of There is no substitution effect on demand for h* as Ph changes,
because the price of medical care is simply a numeraire for that
problem. This is most easily shown by noting that the "real price of
insurance," defined as=Rh.J[—Rh.+ (1 —C)ph], does not change
as p, changes. This is true because Rh. =(1+O)(1 _C)phh*f(l*) and
r h > h * thepartial derivative of that with respect tois simply equiva-
lent to dividing through by Ph. Since Ph is a common factor in all
terms in P,,., there is no change in Ph changes.
rn the integral If the maximum payment is described in physical units (such as
nghts are h*), then, except for the net income effects, there is no effect from
a change in p,. If the limit is in terms of dollars, then the effect
is positive, and the measured elasticity should center around unity,
1 notzero. Put differently, people shouldn't change their demand
for maximum coverage as the price of care changes, except for




ignis basically Finally, I would like to investigate how demand for h* changes
ty of the mar- as the loading fee on insurance changes. To do this, I shall intro-
n the income duce several forms of an insurance premium, specifying different
ire offsetting— types of loading. One common specification is that the loading
duces demand fee, 0,, is applied uniformly to all expected benefits, so that
falls corn- I- 1







'elarger. Thus = >0
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IDemand for Reimbursement InsuranceIn this case, it can be shown that demand for maximum coverage
behaves much as a usual good—there is a negative substitution
effect (demand falls as 0 rises), and an income effect that depends
on whether demand for h* rises or falls with income (i.e., whether
h *isa superior or inferior good). If Oh *101 is positive, then the
income effect (as in the usual case) is negative, and demand for
h* falls asrises.
The substitution component of this derivative is simply
(19) [x(1)] {x(l)]
i.e., the expected value of marginal utility of income times RI
Oh *00,which is positive. Hence, the substitution effect is negative.
I compute the income effect by making OA100 =(OAJOI)RO,
where R9 is the first derivative of R with respect to 9 (holding
C and h* constant) and is positive. Hence, the income effect of a
change in 0 is proportional to the pure income effect and therefore
depends on whether risk aversion is increasing or decreasing. If r(1)
is increasing in income, so that Oh *101 is positive, then the entire
derivative Oh *100isnegative, just as in a "standard" consumer
demand problem.
•Consider now a second possible formulation of the premium
function
(20) R2=02 + 5 (1—C)p,h(1)f(1)dl +
In this formulation, there is a fixed loading fee, (say, sales costs)
but no administrative costs otherwise. Then OR/Oil2 =1,and 02R/
Oh *002 =0.In this case, an increase in 02 produces an income effect,
but no substitution effect; and will be proportional to the income
effect Oh *101
A third possible premium function combines the first two—a
fixed loading charge,and a declining proportional addition,
04—so that
(21) R:1= —[5 (1—C)p,,h(1)f(1)dt+11.
(1_C)plh*f(l)dlj
Underthis pricing scheme, there would be a positive fixed charge
and a declining marginal cost of coverage, as measured by expected
benefits. There is a declining marginal cost ofh*, and such a pricing
scheme can occur only if there are scale economies in coverage.
Clearly, the greater the scale economies (i.e., the higher is 94 in
absolute value), the more h* would be demanded.




































price effectme times —02R/
ifect is negative.
(OAJOI)Re,
ect to 0 (holding






Thus, price changes with h* according to
(22c) = = 20,.,[h* .9Q(i*)+Q(1*)]
=20.,Q(l*)(1 ÷E)
where E is the elasticity of Q(l*) with respect to h*. Thus, as long
as Q(l*) is inelastic with respect to h*, the real price of insurance
(in the EB sense) rises with hHence,Ph' changes with the distribu-
tion of 1, and can fall and then rise asincreases. Such a pricing
function is consistent with observed finite maximum amounts of
insurance coverage in health insurance policies. Notice that
E =—f(1)IIQ (1), since OQ (1)101 =—f(l).The ratio of f(l)/Q (1) is
known in statistics as the hazard function. Thus, Ph. increases
with h* for illness distributions in which the hazard function de-
creases faster than 1 increases, since in that case (1 +E) > 0.
It is quite clear, since Rh'and132R/Oh*00 are of appropriate sign,
that the price effect computed for the premium function R1 also
holds for this premium function; namely, that increases inwill
reduce demand for h* as long as the income component of the
price effect is normal.












Notice that the EB "real price of insurance" can rise with h*, unlike
the other premium functions considered. The real price—the rates



















rd such a pricing
ies in coverage.
higher is 04 in
sts of coverage:2. COMPARATIVE STATICS OF DEMAND FOR
COINSURANCE =
0I
Selecting the coinsurance level, C, is a more complicated analysis
(at least for the analyst!), the complication arising primarily because (assuming
coinsurance subsidizes purchase of a market good (medical care) the substii
rather than simply providing an income transfer. The second major
complication arises because one and only one level of coinsurance (26)fx(1)
C is selected, which must apply to all states of the world less than
j* Because of the interdependence of the different states, compara- For this t( tive statics effects are complex. First, I identify the basic income insurance effect found here by establishing the sign of 82Z/OC 81. must be ir
r 1.
(23) A(l)[—Re —pfth(l)]f(1)dl +fX(l) —phh X(l) increa
income ch
The "income-component" is world, a s
changes.






L° 1' J Oneco
which is the negative of the first-order condition weighted by the demand ri
Arrow-Pratt risk-aversion measure. The expression (—Re —phh) If rates ar
becomes more negative as 1 increases, so increasing risk aversion in the only s
income (decreasing risk aversion in 1) lends less weight to the more age as 1
negative values, making the expression in brackets positive. Hence,
t9C/*91 becomes more negative through this component—demand should
for insurance rises (lower C) if risk aversion in income increases. Since the






This is most easily understood by treating the case wherein h* =
sothat (25) is simply Medical
1°'It9(Rc) 9h1
I Changes
j0Ml) —Ph jjIf(l)dl although
- L nate.As
Notice now that the way the premium derivativechanges with substituti
income is simply the average over all insured states of(1 +0)times change
the average income effect—i.e., change ii




(assuming no income interaction with the priceeffect,OhIOC). Thus,
the substitution effect produced by a change in income is
(26)5A(1)[ci+O)ph - — Phohcl)jf(1)dl
For this to be negative (i.e., making dC/dI negative, so that more
insurance is demanded with income), the income effect, Ohiol,
must be increasing with the level of illness; if OhiOl is constant or
decreasing as 1 increases, it is easy to see that (26) is positive, since
X(1) increases with 1. An important point is that since changes in
income change the relative prices of insuring different states of the
world, a substitution effect on demand for C is introduced when I
changes. Thus one cannot infer anything about risk-aversion
characteristics of the utility function from income elasticities of
demand for coverage; the income elasticity is a composite effect of a
"pure" income effect (dependent on the risk-aversion measure) and
a substitution effect (dependent on how OhIOl changes over losses).
One conclusion that may be drawn from statistical studies of
demand relates to pricing policies of the health insurance industiy.
If rates are set independently of income, then =0,and
the only subsidy effect is obviously to increase demand for cover-
age as I rises. Thus, unless possible decreasing risk aversion
outweighs the substitution effect, "community-rated" insurance
should lead to a positive income' elasticity of demand for coverage.
Since the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans have been traditionally
community-rated rather than experience-rated, enrollment shares of
the Blues should be higher in high-income areas than in low-
income areas, ceteris paribus, since the Blues also offer high-
coverage
inthe price of medical care can also affect demand for C,
although in complex ways, and the sign of the effect is indetermi-
nate. As with demand for h*, there is an income effect and a
changes with substitution effect. The income effect is determined by how the net
s of(1 + 0) times change in income varies over different 1. The income effect of a
change in Ph1Sproportional to























ige in income isox Thusthe si
(27)f(—Re— f(l)dl+f (—Re, — h(1 +Ilhh)a
Pa the
where 8)JOpa is given in (16) and restated in (17). increases,
Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to demand for C demand fo
as are drawn for h*whenPa changes. First, suppose that OhiOl I demandfo
is zero, so that the income effect is entirely a function of r(I),
( interacts w
since = — Sr*(I)— The income effect is then ambiguous
simply the first-order condition weighted by r*(I) and by the ex-
pression S = + Theout-of-pocket budget share, S, must values of 0
increase with 1, so there are larger and larger weights applied to
the more and more negative values in (27), and falls (de-
mand for insurance increases as Pa rises). If risk aversion in income
is increasing (r(I) is falling with 1), then that produces an offsetting
effect, but the net must be to increase demand for insurance (re-
duce C) unless the risk-aversion measure falls faster than the LoadingFee
out-of-pocketbudget share rises. I view this as unlikely.
Finally, if the assumption that Oh/Of =0is removed, then there is Finally, I
an offsetting income effect—there is lower demand for h at all demand f
levels of 1 because of the income effect, so that portion of the premium f
income effect reduces demand for coverage (increases C) as Pa First, cons
rises.










where 1laa is the own-price elasticity for h at any given I and is a
—ORIi'
functionof 1. The components in brackets in (28) show how the (30)
"realprice of coverage" changes as Pa changes, the change being a
function of how the net income transfer (pah +changes. The which
premium slope (—Re) changes with p,,,asdoes the expenditure necessity
the latter as a function of the own-price elasticity for h. The depends o
premium slope changes according to:9 in income
—02RO(—R) i' change if
(29) = C= (1+0)f The sul
—(1—C) +h*Q(1*)I (31) .10x(l)[
where
129 D




and by the ex-








d, then there is










ity for h. The
Thus the substitution effect in part is a function of the deviation of
h(l+'r)hh)aroundits mean (assuming "small" values of 0), so that if
the own-price elasticity of demand for h approaches zero as1
increases, (28) tends to become more negative, indicating increased
demand for insurance (lower C). Thus, part of the effect of Ph Ofl
demand for C depends on how the own-price elasticity for h
interacts with the size of loss 1. The total effect of a change in Ph 15
ambiguous on net, however, because of the remaining term in
as well as additional ambiguity introduced by larger
values of 0 that offset increased demand.
LoadingFees
Finally,I will analyze the effects of changes in the loading fee on
demandfor C. As before, several alternative structures of the
premium function R can be hypothesized and their effects detailed.
First, consider the function
R, = (1+0) [f (1—C)p0hf(l)dl +(1_C)p,1Q(l*)]




f(l)dl + (Re —pnh*)ÔA(l) f(I)dI]
whichhas the usualincome effect properties. Since R0is of
necessity positive for this functional form of R, the income effect
depends on whether there is increasing or decreasing risk aversion
in income, and will have the "usual" income effect of a price
change if risk aversion is such that insurance is a normal good.
The substitution effect produced by a change in 0 is of the form
'.1'
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and so this subst
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+ which can bc.
Oh/oI falls a
Here, a very unusual result appears. There is a standard substitu- possible und






which is positive (thus reducing demand for coverage as 0 in- here, change
creases). But there is also an effect of changes in 0 on the relative increases in
prices of insuring different states of the world, because R9 changes increase den
available income, which changes demand for care in each state. To
This substitution term is of the form insurance po
1.There
'•1'




IfOhiOl increases sufficiently over losses, this term is positive, and 2.States
writter demand for C behaves as a standard good as 0 increases. But if OhiOl
across falls as 1 increases, then there is a general income effect on demand The basic forh(l), and the real price of insuring states of the world tends to fall
1.The ef as 0 increases. If this effect were sufficiently strong, demand for only o coverage might actually rise as 0 increased, although I view this as a usual c remote possibility. Empirically, as I shall show in the next section, the in demand for any measure of insurance I have used behaves "nor- over SI mally"with respect to changes in the loading fee, indicating that mand f this condition does not occur in observed data with sufficient the An strength to produce an unusual price effect. 2.Chang The second premium function I shall consider is effects
=02+f +(1_C)phh*Q(l*) chang€.
a
i.e., one with a lump sum loading fee and no marginal cost of would
different levels of C. Here, R9 = 1, and the usual income effects
I predic'
hold—if C is a "normal" good, demand for coverage falls as °2rises. 3.Althou
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so this substitution effect is
So"X(l)pn — f(l)dl
which can be negative (more demand for insurance with higher 0) if
Oh/al falls as 1 increases. Thus this reversed "price effect" is also
possible under this premium formulation.
The third possible premium function,
R3 =03 — 045(1 —C)p,,f(l)dl
is a combination of the first two, except that there is declining
marginal cost of coverage. Except for the "unusual" price effect
here, changes in 03 are equivalent to those in the function R2, and
increases in 04 (the marginal cost reduction factor) will tend to
increase demand for coverage (lower C).
To summarize these results, recall the specific features of the
insurance policy under discussion:
1.There is restricted choice of insurance parameters—only C
and h* may be chosen, rather than an actual net income
transfer for each state of nature.
2.States of nature are aggregated when the premium function is
written, so that effects of changes in 1,and 0 are linked
across states of the world.
The basic findings are these:
1.The effects of income on demand for insurance depend not
only on how risk aversion changes over income (as in the
usual case of insurance analyzed in the literature) but on how
the income elasticity of demand for medical care changes
over states of the world. Hence, income elasticities of de-
mand for health insurance cannot be used to infer behavior of
the Arrow-Pratt risk-aversion measure over income changes.
2.Changes in the price of medical care produce ambiguous
effects on demand for C. As p,, changes, demand for h*
changes only according to income effects. Thus if there were
a compensated change in Ph,flO changein demand for h*
would be expected. If the price change is uncompensated, no
prediction of the effect is possible.
3.Although usual loading fees are not the "true" price of
insurance, the effects of an increase in 0 are generally
analogous to an increase in the price of any commodity or
good. A possible theoretical exception arises when consider-
ing demand for C, which may be more predominant under
some premium-writing schemes than others.
131 Demand for Reimbursement Insurance3. DEMAND ESTIMATION servicewill
Demand curves for medical care have been estimated from a ciency in s
household survey of 2,367 families drawn in 1963 by the Center for estimated f
Health Administration Studies (CHAS) of the University of medical exp
Chicago. The families responded to questions about their insurance variance (hc
companies during the household interview, and direct verification
of the parameters of the policy was made from the insurance
companies. This is the only source of data I am aware of (except the
1970 survey by CHAS, not yet completed) that provides explicit 4DEMAND dataon parameters of insurance policies purchased by individual
families; hence its uniqueness. Unfortunately, verification was not From the
complete because some insurers did not respond and response was parameter
nonrandom. Thus, only families with all policies verified have been maximum p
used for this study, and the data have been weighted to reproduce variable ca
the actual sample means in terms of socioeconomic parameters Some poli
known to affect the response rate. There remain 1,579 families in hospital
the study, 970 of which have some health insurance. An earlier equal to
study using these data (Phelps, 1973) provides more complete maximum p
descriptions of the data source. Those studies established in gen- $40, the lat
eral that there was a positive income elasticity of demand for health Demand
insurance, varying considerably by type of insurance. It was also squares
established that health insurance was highly sensitive to the posed by T
loading fee on the insurance, measured in this case by the size of cause of th
the group through which insurance was obtained. A rough estimate tobit
from these data is that the elasticity of insurance with respect to produced (i
changes in 0wasabout —0.3 to —0.5. The effects of changes in the to 2.8 per c
price of medical care were ambiguous, and the results varied the excepti
considerably depending on the method of estimation used. Here, I had the larl
have attempted some additional analyses of these data, using new at the limit
measures of the price of medical care facing each family, in an are shown
attempt to improve those estimates. I have also added measures of explanator
the wage rate facing the head of each household derived from OLS of all the x
estiniates of the wage, rate, using fitted values for heads not specificati
employed, terms and
The medical care price measures are obtained through instru- In the
mental variable estimation of prices for those with positive utiliza- related to
tion. The estimating equations are in the appendix, Table 8. The tionedpre'
dependent variables in these equations are expense/unit of ser- risk aversi
vice, and the explanatory variables include dummies for eight price of in
geographic regions, measures of physician and hospital supply, can, howe
wages of the family head, nonwage income, and education of the another
head. The last variables reflect possible demand for higher-quality deductibil
132
IPhelps 133 Deservice with higher income, and education is a measure of effi-
ciency in search for lower prices. Separate price equations were
estimated for hospital services, for surgical care, and for total
medical expense. The equations explained from 17 per cent of the
variance (hospital price) to 5 per cent (total care).'°
4.DEMAND FOR COVERAGE
Fromthe available data in the 1963 CHAS-NORC survey, one
parameter closely matches thetheoreticalvariable C—the
maximum payment per hospital day chosen by the consumer. This
variable can vary from $0 (no coverage) to any positive amount.
Some policies specify full coverage of semi-private rooms (or
hospital wards), and for these purposes I assigned a dollar figure
equal to the 95th percentile of the observed distribution of actual
maximum payments. Thus the dependent variable ranges from 0 to
$40, the latter figure being the largest maximum in these data.
Demand functions have been estimated using both ordinary least
squares (OLS) and the limited dependent variable technique pro-
posed by Tobin (1958), known informally as "tobit" analysis. Be-
cause of the nature of the dependent variable in these regressions,
tobit analysis is preferable a priori. Actually, the tobit regressions
produced (in three of four dependent variables) slightly higher (0.3
to 2.8 per cent higher) mean square error than the OLS estimates,
the exception being demand for major medical insurance, which
had the largest fraction of observations with the dependent variable
at the limit. Both sets of regressions are reported here. The results
are shown in Table 1, with quadratic terms for the continuous
explanatory variables. I show elasticities calculated at mean values
of all the x's and of y, with tratiosin parentheses. The quadratic
specification is desirable on grounds of significance of the quadratic
terms and will be discussed exclusively.
In the OLS equation, income is positively and significantly
related to insurance demand, the elasticity being 0.22. As men-
tioned previously, one cannot infer from this that there is increasing
risk aversion in income because of complex changes in the real
price of insurance that are associated with an income change. One
can, however, impute some fraction of that income elasticity to
another subsidy; namely, that occurring through the income tax
deductibility of insurance premiums on federal and state taxes. The
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TABLE 1Demand for Maximum Payment per Hospital Day
(HOSMAX) (n =1522)
OLS TOBIT
Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity













































































F (20, 1501) 57.836 —
X2(d.f.=20) — 852.66








Estimating the effect of income tax deductibility on demand for
insurance several assumptions. First, for group insurance
premiums paid by the employer, I assume that the entire amount is
exempted from both income tax and payroll tax." In 1963, person-
ally paid premiums could be combined with out-of-pocket medical
expense and deducted subject to a 3 per cent of adjusted gross
income (AGI) limitation. Data from Mitchell and Phelps (1974)
enable one to estimate how the marginal income tax rate changes
with income—the estimate is that ÔMTR(8I/I) =0.1.This estimate
applies only to personally paid premiums. For employer premiums,
135
IDemand for Reimbursement Insurancethe progression of marginal tax rateis lower because of the
incidence of social security taxes; data in Mitchell and Phelps allow that the grou
an estimate of ÔMTR(ôl/I) =0.05for premiums paid by employ- an estimate
ers.'2 quadratic sp
For employer-group premiums, the total income elasticity is ity with resp
decomposed as elasticity wi
Of particr
ÔMTR 1 price of m 'ki71(1 + 17(9al/i variable fiw
shown), ther
whereis the total income elasticity. I have estimated=—0.7 linear and qi for policies in which 0.2.Thus — 0.7(0.05)(1/0.2) relationship = —0.175.Thus the tax subsidy is a substantial portion of the prices first
estimated income elasticity (see below), anticipated
For family-paid premiums, the effect is more difficult to estimate, effect of
At one extreme, if the family did not anticipate having premiums The tobit
plus unreimbursed medical expenses exceeding a "deductible" of differences.
3 per cent of AGI, there would be no effect. At the other extreme, if (0.23), and ti
the family knew with certainty that such a deductible would be 0.86, rather
exceeded, the appropriate correction would be twice that computed
for employer-paid premiums, since the marginal tax rate for indi-
viduals progresses faster (ÔMTRIOI/I =0.1)when the payroll taxes
are excluded. Offsetting this would be higher loading fees paid on
many family premiums. The calculation must be made on the 5, DEMAND
anticipationsof the family, and hence cannot be computed
Three directly—certainly the expected frequency of taking the deduction
measures with error the true perception, since the family has more maximum n
information about itself than is revealed by average behavior.'3 payment all
Under 15 per cent of families in 1963 actually used the medical under a maj
deduction, the rate generally falling with income, so the estimate estimates 0
continuous that little or no effect is present in the income elasticity estimate is
Results probably more accurate than using the full value.
loading fee' As a general summary, since about 40 per cent of premiums were
I
meansof th paid by employers in 1963, and since that induces an upward bias
mum), ancl( of 0.1 to 0.25 in the estimated income elasticity, a rough correction
to factor for the estimates presented might be 0.4 times 0.1 to 0.25, or a income elas reduction of 0.04 to 0.1. estimated t Demand for coverage is quite sensitive to the price of insurance.
i
tiveand In these data, the instrument for price is the group size from which
payment theinsurance was obtained. Insurance texts contain data on how With wage premiums fall with size of total group premium, from which one can those repor compute how the loading fee falls with the size of the group. For The resp the scaling of group size used in these regressions, it is approxi- The hospit mately true over the entire range that dm0/din (group size) =—1,so remaining t
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Ithat the group-size elasticities. should be multiplied by —1 to obtain
an estimate of the own-price elasticity with respect to Inthe
quadratic specification of demand for payment per day, the elastic-
ity with respect to group size at the mean is 0.67, (t =23.53), so the
elasticity with respect to 0is—0.67.
Of particular interest is the response of payment per day to the
price of medical care faced by the consumer (an instrumental
variable fitted from an OLS regression). In the linear equation (not
shown), there is no response. In the quadratic specification, both the
linear and quadratic terms are highly significant, suggesting that the
relationship between demand for payment per day and hospital
prices first rises and then falls as pp, increases. Thus, as might be
anticipated with the complex interactions shown in (27)—(29), the
effect of Phondemand for Cvarieswith Ph.
Thetobit regression for this equation shows few significant
differences. The estimated income elasticity isslightly higher
(0.23), and the estimated elasticity with respect to work-group size is
0.86, rather than the 0.67 found in the OLS equation.
5.DEMAND FOR MAXIMUM COVERAGE
Threevariables measure maximum coverage in these data—the
maximum number of hospital days covered, the maximum surgical
payment allowed in the fee schedule, and the maximum payment
under medical insurance plan. Tables 2 through 4 present
estimates of demand for each of these variables, with each of the
continuous variables entered in quadratic form.
Results are similar for all three. Each is highly elastic to the
loading fee, with OLS estimates of the group-size elasticity at the
means of the data equal to 0.63 (hospital days), 0.67 (surgical maxi-
mum), and 0.68 (major medical insurance maximum), corresponding
to elasticities with respect to 0ofthe negative of those values. The
income elasticity for two of these maximum payment parameters is
estimated to be zero, although the wage-income elasticity is posi-
tive and significant for hospital days ('i0.29), maximum surgical
payment ('i =0.48),and for major medical maximum ('i =1.07).
With wage income omitted, the income elasticities are similar to
those reported for wage-rate elasticities (Phelps, 1973).
The response of these variables to medical prices is interesting.
The hospital maximum variable is in physical units, whereas the
remaining two are in dollar units, so "no response" in the first case
137
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which one can
the group. For
s, it is approxi-
p size) =—1,sois a zero elasticity, and "no response" in the remaining two cases is TABLE2M
a unitary elasticity, in which case a 1 per cent increase inwould
cause a 1 per cent change in the maximum, leaving the "real"
maximum unchanged. For the hospital days, the response is cur-
vilinear, first increasing and then decreasing. At the mean price, the
elasticity is near zero and not significant. This result, using the same Variable
data but an imputed medical price that is area-specific, is similar to
one reached by Phelps (1973). The surgical maximum payment has ncome
a positive elasticity of 0.64 (t =2.98),but the dependent variable is Income squared
in dollar terms, so this implies a reduction in the real coverage
maximum as prices rise. In the major medical maximum equation,
the effect of medical prices is estimated to be=1.13(t =0.91), Wage
which is similar to results using the earlier price measure, but less
precise. This result suggests a slightly increasing demand for Wage squared
maximum coverage with price increases.
Some secondary evidence is available on the effect of medical Work-group size
prices on demand for insurance. Some of the families in the sample
were eligible (for various reasons) for reduced-rate or free medical Group size
care, either through welfare or for professional courtesy. Although
square
these variables may be confounded with income (permanent in-
come is held constant in these regressioris), the tobit demand Hospital price
curves show systematic strong negative relationships between index
obtaining some free care and the demand for insurance.15 It is
Hospital price possible to interpret these free-care sources as very low medical square prices, in which case (at low prices) one would expect a positive
relationship between medical prices and demand for coverage.
This is exactly the case with the actual medical price variables, of Estimated illness
course—the effect of price increases is first to increase, and then
decrease, demand for coverage. At the average of the sample, as has Illness squared
been mentioned, the effect is essentially zero on demand for C, and
there exists some evidence for a positive effect on demand for h*. Education
The remaining variable of interest in these equations is the effect of head
of estimated illness on demand for coverage.Particularly in
community-rated insurance, it can be shown that persons with Education
higher anticipated illness levels should have demands for more squared
insurance. The estimated loss variable is an instrumental variable
regression, showing in essence the average illness level for persons Age of head
in a given age-sex-income class. Although this variable is of general
interest, it is not a sufficient variable with which to test the problem Age squared
of adverse self-selection against insurance companies. The crucial
question for self-selection analysis is whether residuals in a regres- Race
sion study of insurance demand are correlated with residuals in a (1=nonwhite)
regression study of medical care demand, and itis this latter
138 Phelps 139139 Demand for Reimbursement Insurance
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Constant term 184.02 —675.867
(2.36) (4.94)
R4 205 —
F (20, 1470) 18.909 —
X2 (d.f.='20) — 544.47
problem that TSLS estimators should be helpful in solving. Unless
some measure of anticipated health status on each individual were
available, studies such as those I have performed here are not likely
to show strong effects of illness on demand for insurance. Notice
that community-rated insurance is tantamount to hiding from the
insurance company information on individual illness, so that if
community rating dominated the insurance industry, even the
age-sex-race-income specific illness measure I use here should
have some association with demand for insurance. To the extent
that experience rating predominated, one would expect illness
measures to have but slight effects on insurance demand.
In the hospital maximum payment per day equation, the effect at
the mean illness level is small, but the quadratic formulation shows
the effect to be increasing with illness levels, so that for high
expected losses, more insurance would be chosen. In the maximum
hospital coverage equation, the effect is negative at mean values of
expected illness, but again is increasing with losses. In the surgical
maximum equation, the estimated effect is zero at mean values, but
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TABLE 3Demand for Maximum Surgical Payment
(SURMAX) (n =1493)
OLS TOBIT
Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity
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demand for major medical maximum payment. Thus, the simultane-
otis aspect of medical demand and insurance demand would appear
to be particularly acute for persons with very high expected
illnesses, but not severe at mean values of illness in this population.
Nevertheless, simultaneous equation methods are indicated in
medical demand studies because of this association.
The tobit regressions in general show similar results for each of
these three equations. The differences will be highlighted here.
First, for hospital days the estimated income elasticity is positive
(0.36) and significant (z= 2.36),where zisa unit normal variate.
The elasticity with respect to work-group size is slightly higher.
One surprising result is that the demand for hospital days coverage
falls as a function of estimated increase in illness; the elasticity is
—0.42 (z= 1.64).In demand for maximum surgical coverage, the
142 (Phelps 143































































































































































Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity

























(2.25)TABLE 4 (concluded) majormec
elasticityb
OLS TOBIT Taken t(
Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity medical
Variable (t statistic) (t statistic) (z statistic) (z statistic) insurance
hospital or
Race (1= This accou
nonwhite) 368.12 1668.83 and surgic
(.59) quite high
Sex recalled th (1= female) 840.80 9120.07
(1.45) (2.98) 1963, at w







(1 = yes) —77.644 —9637.624
(.09) (1.55) 6. OBSER\
Freecare
(1=yes) —541.21 —2133.249 The 1963
(.71) (.48) coinsuran
Constant term—6289.0 —1.007 E-07 families,
(1.07) (324) Unliketh
R2 .171 equations
F(20,1558) 16.096 — variation




only difference is a 20 per cent increase in the estimated own-price available
elasticity of demand for coverage, the elasticity with respect to maximum
work-group size being 1.06 (z = 14.98). expense,
In demand for major medical insurance, the tobit regression maximum
should be and is superior to OLS because in a large fraction of the coverage
observations the dependent variable is clustered at the limit. The regressiol
estimated regressions are considerably different. The income elas- maximum
ticity of demand for major medical maximum is 0.47 (z = 0.97), and than the
the estimated elasticity with respect to wage rate is 1.67 (z = 2.63). =
Taken together, these suggest an extremely high income elasticity For
of demand for major medical insurance. Demand for major medical ly), the av
coverage is also quite sensitive to the price of medical care, with an was estim
elasticity of 1.77 (z = 1.09), an extremely large elasticity compared ous varial
to other results found here even if precision is low. Demand for 24.83 (7
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major medical coverage also rises with estimated illness, the
elasticity being 1.01 (z= 1.26).
Taken together, these results suggest that persons facing high
medical care prices, particularly those with high incomes, shift
insurance coverage from basic medical care coverage (such as
hospital or surgical insurance) into a major medical insurance plan.
This accounts for the relatively low response of the basic hospital
and surgical coverage parameters to medical care prices and the
quite high response of major medical coverage. It should be
recalled that these estimates are derived from data obtained for
1963, at which time less than 20 per cent of the population had
major medical insurance. That ratio now exceeds 40 per cent, so
these values may have changed considerably between 1963 and the
present.
6.OBSERVED COINSURANCE RATES
The1963 CHAS-NORC data also permit estimation of the observed
coinsurance rates resulting from insurance policies held by the
families, and from their actual medical purchases during the year.
Unlike the insurance parameter equations presented above, these
equations contain a considerably random component induced by
variation in actual health outcomes during the year; hence, their
precision is much lower than the previous estimates. The de-
pendent variable takes on values from 0 to 1 inclusive, expressed as
benefits/expenses =coveragerate. Observations with zero ex-
penses in each category studied were deleted, since no data are
available to compute a coverage rate for them. Table 5 shows
maximum likelihood logistic regressions for coverage rates on total
expense, hospital expense, and physician office expenses. The
maximum likelihood estimator relates the dependent variable
coverage to explanatory variables in a fashion analogous to normal
regression, the major difference being that the error term in this
maximum likelihood regression has a logistic distribution, rather
than the usual normal distribution. The partial derivativeis
=(l—y) and the elasticity is = X•
For total expense (representing all medical outlays by the fami-
ly), the average coverage rate in 1963 was 13 per cent. The equation
was estimated in linear form and with quadratic terms for continu-
ous variables. A chi-square test on the vector of quadratic terms is
24.83 (7 d.f.), rejecting the hypotheses that these coefficients are
145




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5jointly zero; hence, the quadratic specification is presented. Three How do
variables have effects significantly different from zero—the loading policy pan
fee instrument (group size), with an elasticity at the mean of 0.58 mates, the
(z= 5.94);receipt of welfare care, with an elasticity of —1.48 and magni
(z= 1.80);and wage income, with an elasticity of 0.71 (z= 1.76). parameters
The price of medical care had no apparent effect on demand for and the "ci
coverage, either in the linear or quadratic specifications. Nonwage elasticity o
income had an elasticity of 0.05 (z= 1.30),so the combined income logistic est
elasticity is near 0.75. Age and education both show significant price elast
coefficients in the quadratic specification (but not the linear), but smaller va
the combined effect of these variables in combination is not etc.). The
significant. series of
The coverage of hospital expenses is similar. Here, the quadratic although t
terms are not significantly different from zero, so the linear specifi- lower thar
cation is presented. The price of insurance is again the major function of
predictor of demand, with an elasticity of 0.31 on the group-size From the
variable (z= 6.13).The wage income elasticity is 0.31, under half price elasti
that for total expense (z= 1.66),and receipt of welfare care has a
' tothe
negative effect (q—0.85, z= 2.63).The price of hospital care had Similarly,
a negative but insignificant effect on demand for coverage
I estimatew
=—0.2,z= 1.05),as is true for the expected illness variable. nonwage
In 1963 medical office visits were covered at a much lower rate results on
than hospital care and surgical care, the average coverage being inconclusi
slightly under 7 per cent. However, as with hospital care, the major In the low
predictor. both in terms of statistical precision and magnitude is the LOGIT e
work-group size. This instrument for the loading fee of insurance respect to
has an elasticity of 0.64 (z= 4.11).This implies an own-price medical p
elasticity of demand for physician office coverage of about —2/3, of the expi
quite elastic compared with estimates of demand for physician from the
officecareitself (Newhouse and Phelps,1974; Phelps and measurabi
Newhouse, 1974). The major difference between demand for coverage.
physician office coverage and for hospital coverage is that the price surement
of office care is positively and significantly related to demand for fitted fror
coverage. The elasticityis estimated to be 0.24 at the mean medical c
(z= 2.08).This difference between demand for physician office persons ii
coverage and other types of care may well be related to the average Other mei
existing coverage. As, pointed out in the theoretical discussion similar to
earlier in this paper, the response of the demand for coverage to conceptua
medical prices may well be nonlinear, and this presents some regional a
evidence that indeed the coverage is positively related to price of Fuchs a
medical care when the coverage level was initially low. As cover- insurance
age rises, as for example in the case of hospital care, the response to variable is











































How do these estimates compare with those using insurance
policy parameters as dependent variables? In both sets of esti-
mates, the primary predictor in terms of both explanatory power
and magnitude is the price of insurance. Maximum payment
parameters have an own-price elasticity of between —0.5 and —1.0,
and the "coverage" types of parameter HOSMAX has an own-price
elasticity of about —0.7. The coverage parameters obtained from the
logistic estimates using expenditure and benefit data show own-
price elasticities of about —0.4 for total medical expense, with
smaller values for component expenditures (hospital, M.D. office,
etc.). The value of —0.4 is about half that obtained from annual time
series of aggregated benefits and expenditures (Phelps, 1973),
although the mean loading fee in the time series is considerably
lower than in the 1963 data used here, and the elasticity is a
function of 0inthe logistic specification of the dependent variable.
From the time series estimates in Phelps (1973), the fitted own-
price elasticity for 1963 for coverage was —0.26, considerably closer
to the above estimate than the time series value taken at the mean.
Similarly, the income elasticity at the mean from the time series
estimate was 0.39, somewhat lower than the combined wage and
nonwage elasticities taken from these results. The time series
results on the effects of medical prices on demand for coverage are
inconclusive, being highly sensitive to functional form employed.
In the lowest mean-squared-error equation (Phelps, 1973, Table 18,
LOGIT equation), the elasticity at the mean of coverage with
respect to p,, was 0.83 (z= 2.53),suggesting a strong effect of
medical prices on insurance demand. The value using 1963 levels
of the explanatory variables is 0.79. This result differs considerably
from the estimates found here—that medical prices have no
measurable effect on insurance demand except for M.D. office
coverage. The question can be raised, of course, concerning mea-
surement error in the medical price variable used here, since it is
fitted from a regression estimate of persons with positive use of
medical care, and represents, in effect, the average price paid by
persons in a given region and of specific socioeconomic grouping.
Other medical price variables used in Phelps (1973) yield results
similar to those found here, although those other variables are
conceptually similar to the instrument used in this paper—they are
regional averages, adjusted for income differences.
Fuchs and Kramer investigated demand for physician office care
insurance using interstate aggregated data wherein the dependent
variable is the absolute level of benefits (BEN). They found BEN to
be highly related to income=0.76to 1.61) and also highly
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Education of head 5.16 1.67
Age of head 4.74 1.91
Medical price index 1.00 .09
Physician price index 1.06 .16
Hospital price index .83 .18
Estimated illness 3.34 .752
Work-group size (scaled) 3.13 2.92
Free care .068 .25
Welfare care .059 .24
Nonwhite .139 .34





own-price sensitive—on the order of —1.58 to —1.74. They also
found benefits strongly negatively relatedto medical prices
—0.74, see their Table 18, Equation (D.4)). Since actual
medical purchases also fall with medical prices= —0.1to —0.3,
tending around about —0.25), this means that coverage (BEN!
EXPENSE) falls with medical prices as well, in contradiction to the
large time series estimate in Phelps (1973) for total medical ex-
penses, and to the smaller positive effect found here for M.D. office
coverage. These conflicting results suggest that there still remains a
considerable amount to be learned about the effects of medical
prices on demand for insurance, and unfortunately, the theory
provides little guidance in this matter.
Other researchers have estimated demand curves for insurance as
well. M. Feldstein (1973) concluded that "a rise in the price of
hospital services causes an increase in the proportion enrolled and
in the total quantity of insurance." His estimated elasticity of

























































Race (1 =nonwhite) .134 .341 0 1
Age of head (scaled) 4.66 1.846 1 8
Education (scaled) 5.32 1.617 1 8
Sex of head (1 =female) .191 .393 0 1
Welfare care (1 =yes) .043 .204 0 1
Free care (1 =yes) .0567 .231 0 1
Family size 3.33 1.892 1 16
Rural/Urban (rural =1) .308 .462 0 1
Permanent income 6349.2 3047 —379516898
Wage income/week 116.16 37.97 —12.743 220.24
Work-group size (scaled) 3.802 3.048 1 8
Estimated illness level 3.411 .730 1.157 6.316
Nonwage income 758.42 2169 0 7000
Coverage percentage .1278 .239 0 1
Medical prices (estimated) 1.00 .085 .767 2.382
Sample size:2,328 families with positivemedical expense (2,367 original)
For M.D. office visits, add the following:
M.D. office coverage
percentage .068 .200 0 1
M.D. office price index 7.210 7.208 .25 125.00
Sample size:1,839 families with positiveM.D. office
For hospitalizations, add the following:
Hospital coverage percentage .717 .361 0 1
Hospital price index .835 .160 .393 1.269
Sample size:489 families with positive hospital expense
NOTE;For M.D.officeand for hospital coverage percentage equations, summary statistics on inde-
penclent variables differ slightly from those given for the sample of 2,328 families.
elasticity calculated to be 1.21. He also estimates an own-price
effect on demand for insurance of —0.09 (and insignificant), al-
though he estimates a strong positive relationship between an
instrumentfor group insuranceavailability(percentageof
employees in each state who work in manufacturing or govern-







































own-price may preclude precise estimation of either.'6 Given the
conflicting results of my cross-section survey data studies, my ag-
gregate time series studies, and the state cross-section studies of
Feldstein, Frech, and Fuchs and Kramer, it is clear that much re-












































































































R2 .05 .17 .09
F(d.f.) 8.036 (14,222) 8.24 (14,556) 1.65 (14,229)
















































the effects of medical prices on demand. The question is of
specialsignificance because of possible supplementation of
universal (if only partial) coverage that may be introduced under
national health insurance. If supplementation is highly responsive
to medical prices, then large demand shifts in the medical care
system could be exacerbated by additional demand induced
through purchase of supplemental insurance policies.
NOTES
1.It is easy to show thath(1) is an increasing function of i—more illness heads for
more medical care purchase—as long as the income elasticity of demand for
health (H) is positive. See Phelps (1973) for proof.
2.The proof of this is in Phelps (1973).
3.It is not the case thath(l) =h,the average medical care consumption in insured
states.
4.In Ted Frech's comment, he points out that "moral hazard" (I interpret this to
mean non-zero price elasticity) acts like a tax on the loading fee. This is true in
one sense, but the analogy is not perfect. At least in formulations of an
insurance premium that I have pursued, the "tax' of the non-zero elasticity
applies only to a portion of a premium—that for insured states of the world
under h* (obviously), and that portion of demand that is added when C is
lowered. Reducing C would increase the premium (i.e., R. would be negative)
even if werezero, since the insurer would pay a larger fraction of the bills.
Notice also that the "tax" of the price elasticity is related to the level of
insurance—it is highest when C approaches zero and when h* is very large.
5.The optimality always holds in demand for h* if the consumer is risk averse.
That is, if (5) is zero, then the denominator of (8) is negative. However, in
demand for C, the optimality is guaranteed for solutions of(4) equal to zero only
if demand for h is perfectly price inelastic—the case considered by most
previous analyses of insurance. When t9hIOC is negative, the denominator of (9)
must be assumed to be negative, even if the consumer is risk averse.
6.It can be shown that Ra. is not a function of income, with the insurance
premium functions I consider below.
7.For notational simplicity, the dependence of Aandr(1) on us dropped here.
8.This has been observed in a multiple regression study of state market shares of
the Blues; state income is positively and significantly related to market shares
of Blue Cross and Blue Shield, ceteris paribus. (Phelps, unpublished paper.)
9.I make the simplifying assumption that
o'h
=0
10.In Phelps (1973), the measure of price was derived from BLS statistics on
expenditure for medical care in forty-six cities and rural areas. These data were
used to construct a price index for each of the primary sampling units (PSU)
from which the 2,367 families were drawn. The measure attributed the sanie
regional price to each person living in a PSU, a measure that is considerably
less person-specific than the regression estimation of price I use here.
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IDemandfor Reimbursement Insurance11.If the person earns more than the base amount of the payroll (social security) 3
_____
tax,the appropriate marginal tax rate does not include the payroll tax rate. In
1963, the maximum earnings taxed by the payroll tax were $4,800. 4Dickers
12.The first equation estimated yaverage marginal income tax rates. The 5Ehrlich
equation estimate wasy =—0.61+ 0.09 log (income) R2 =0.84,N=19income
.
(t=9.52) e
groups. Data on income groups were obtained from IRS files. The second
6F ld t equation estimated used interval brackets reporting total marginal tax rates
. es ei
(income plus payroll), with the midpoint of income intervals used as the
explanatory variable. The estimated equation was y =—0.09+ 0.04 x log (in- 7
come)R20.46,N8.
These data reflect 1970 incomes. Because the social security cutoff income in 8Fuchs 1963 was lower, there may have been more progressiveness in 1963 than is
indicated by the second estimate. For this reason, I use 0.05 as an estimate of
B ÔMTP.iôl/I.
9.Keeler, I
13.This problem is analogous to how a family behaves when faced with random
expenses and is covered by an insurance policy with a deductible. For an
a discussion, see Keeler, Newhouse, and Phelps (1974).
14.See Mitchell and Phelps (1974) for details of this computation. In brief, the
10Mitchell calculation is this: A relationship between loading fee and work-group size is in derived from an insurance textbook. The data are then fitted with an OLS 0 equation of the form ln(O) =a0+ a1ln (GROUPSIZE). The estimatedwas
—0.998 (t9.39), which is ÔOIÔG.GlO.The inverse of this is the correction
11M factor to convert group-size elasticities to loading fee for elasticities.
. OsSIfl,
15.These coefficients were systematically lower and had smaller t ratios in the
OLS regressions than in the tobit regressions presented here. In the four 12.Newhou
demand equations shown, none of the free-care or welfare-case coefficients
were significant at usual significance levels in the OLS regressions, whereas
h 1 the welfare coefficients are all significant at least at p =0.12and the free-care 13.P e PS,
coefficients are significant in the hospital insurance demand equations with
14
p<0.10 in the tobit regression.
15
16.Goldstein and Pauly, in a paper presented at this conference, estimate a loading .
feeelasticity of —0.33, where the dependent variable is total premiums. Their
data do now allow an estimate to be made of the effect of medical prices on
16PttI
insurancedemand. Frech, in a comment on this paper, reports studies using
. ra
aggregate state data, estimates an own-price elasticity for insurance very near
17Sth1
zero,and an income elasticity of 0.17. He further reports an estimated effect of
.
hospitalprices on demand for insurance to be —0.38, quite in contrast to the
18T bin figure derived by M. Feldstein using similar data. The dependent variable in
. 0
Frech'swork is the proportion of hospital expenses paid for by insurance,
directly analogous to the hospital equation in my Table 5.
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H. E. Frech III
University of California, Santa Barbara
This is a very interesting paper. It represents an attempt to properly formulate
a model of demand for health insurance, making use of the fundamental
insight from the Arrow-Pauly discussion of the 1960s that health insurance is
characterized by moral hazard and is riot merely an aggregation of con-
tingent claims. This is an important enterprise because all insurance and
many other financial contracts contain some sort of moral hazard. So the
theory of moral hazard is important for the analysis of financial markets in
general.
For policy purposes,itis important to know the relative extent of moral
hazard (wherein more insurance increases the expected medical expendi-
ture) versus adverse selection (wherein higher expected medical expendi-
tures increase the extent of insurance).If adverse selection is relatively
important, incomplete insurance and interpersonal variationin extent of
insurance may reflect inefficient use of resources in trying to detect individual
differences in risk and adjusting insurance contracts to minimize adverse
selection. If so, a mandatory program of reasonably complete insurance for
everyone may be efficient. It offers the hope of avoiding the resources spent in
merely discovering individual differences in risk and adjusting contracts to
such differences. Such private expenditures have a private return, but no
social return. If moral hazard is relatively important, optimal insurance would
be incomplete and vary a great deal on the basis of varying tastes for risk and,
especially, varying elasticities of demand for the insured service (medical
care).
Moral hazard works like a tax or extra loading charge on the insurance,
which increases with the extent of insurance. Thus, it leads to the private
choice of incomplete insurance, given the choice of various alternative
insurance contracts. This private choice is socially optimal if (1) there is no
alternative method of organizing the sale of insurance that will eliminate the
moral hazard—the usual case—and (2) insurance is supplied competitively.
Thus, moral hazard destroys the optimality of complete insurance, even if the
insurance is priced at expected loss. A mandatory program of complete
insurance will lead to inefficient moral hazard losses.
In the Phelps paper, moral hazard enters the model because of the form of
the benefits—a subsidy for the purchase of medical care, not a simple
contingent claim. This is clear in the budget constraint under insurance, his
equation (2):
I=x+Cphh+R
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reasonable. However, there is one result that seem a bit odd to me. The
result would seem to hinge on the way in which the moral hazard welfare loss
varies over the extent of insurance.
The result that concerns me is: The optimal limit h* is finite if the insurance
load is positively related to the size of the expected benefits. This result
indicates that the marginal moral hazard loss is increasing in the extent of
insurance.
The easy way to see this is to first imagine a situation in which the insurance
is simply an aggregate contingent claim. In this case, the true price of
deepening the coverage (raising the h*) is simply the expected value of the
loss plus some proportional load. The consumer will keep increasing h*
without limit as long as risk aversion does not fall as income decreases. This
is the basis for the standard argument that the optimal insurance, in the
presence of transactions costs, involves a deductible and otherwise full
coverage—placing a floor on ex post income.
For Phelps' result, the rising real price of insurance as h* increases must be
ascribed to rising marginal moral hazard, since load is held constant or is
falling.It seems clear that his model is characterized by a marginal moral
hazard loss that begins at zero when there is no insurance and rises as
insurance becomes more complete, finally choking off further insurance
purchases at a finite upper limit.
This is counter to the views of such scholars as Mark Pauly and Martin
Feldstein, who favor insurance with large deductibles and complete insurance
for large losses. Furthermore, it is counter to the generally held notions about
the nature of medical care. The usual view is that the elasticity of demand
for relatively minor elective medical problems is large, in part because there
are many reasonable ways of treating the conditions. For more serious prob-
lems, the technological possibilities are much more limited so that the ill
effects of moral hazard are much reduced. Furthermore, for really large losses,
the possibilities for more than usual treatment often involve experimental
techniques. For these cases, a richer model than simple consumer choice of
level of medical care may be useful.
In any case, the usual view is that marginal moral hazard decreases with
increasing loss. If that view is correct, then Phelps' proof of the optimality of a
finite insurance limit is no help. We are left with arguments about(1)the ability
to use private and government charity as the size of loss increases and (2) a
low marginal utility of wealth and/or medical care for consumers who have
experienced heavy losses. The latter argument is made persuasively in Dick
Zeckhauser's recent article on catastrophic insurance (1973).
As an aside, I might mention that Phelps' proof here is more general than he
supposes. He states that the optimal h* is finite only if part of the insurance
load is proportional to the expected benefits. However, his proof turns on the
sign of the partial derivative of the true price of insurance with respect to h*.
From his Equation (17) it is clear that his result holds if the loading, 0, is equal
to zero. Thus, the optimal h* would be finite even if insurance were available
at actuarily fair rates.
In my own work, I have formulated a model of the interrelationships of health
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insurance regulation, health insurance markets, and health care markets that of insuranc
run roughly as follows. A major effect of health insurance regulation is to give what Felds
nonprofit medical provider-controlled insurers (Blue Cross and Blue Shield) a in
competitive advantage over commercial insurers. Because of their legal price of ho
status, these insurers cannot retain the monopoly rents that these regulatory a more fle
advantages make possible. However, these nonprofit insurers can benefit the squared te
providers by raising the demand curve for medical services by offering only Another
relatively complete insurance in the market. This overly complete (in terms of average
consumer preferences) insurance leads to increased demand for health insurance
services, as it is intended to. selection
I
In order to empirically examine the model, it is necessary to construct a makes the
model of the interactions of the insurance and medical care markets— difficult on
otherwise alternative explanations (to the regulatory one) cannot be disputed. At this
I have used state data for the year 1969, the last year for which complete data holding cc
are available. The econometric model has five equations and is estimated by held by
two-stage least squares. I will present some preliminary results that bear on Phelps
Phelps' work. This is especially valuable, since econometric analyses so that load i
often are not robust over different data sets. And I basically corroborate his does not I
findings, some inte
In this work, I have simply taken the average proportion paid by third-party insurance
payers as the measure of the extent of insurance. Also, my work is limited to between
hospital care. The demand equation determining the extent of insurance in my directly i
system is (standard errors in parentheses): insurance
for all mr
(1) I = 0.518 — 0.0540 PRINS + 0.00012 INC — 0.0065 PHOS + 0.404 BCMSR, The e ua
(0.404) (0.00004) (0.0032) (0.210) sian, BCI
n = 46 firms. Ba
variables where
= proportion of hospital expenses paid by insurers (2) LD
PRINS = price of insurance
INC = per capita disposable income (3) LDBC'
PHOS = price of hospital care (endogenous)
BCMSR = Blue Cross market share (endogenous)
(4) .LDC'
The coefficient of variation is not reported because itis meaningless in
two-stage estimation.
The resu Phelps found an income elasticity of demand for health insurance of about
loadin 0.23. In my equation, that elasticity is slightly lower, about 0.17. Furthermore,
Cross?n
the standard error is less than half the estimated coefficient.
. bar e S Turning to the estimated price elasticity of demand for insurance, the
esti mated elasticity in my data is very low, —0.004 when defined the same as
insuranc
Phelps' variable. Feldstein (1973) also found a very low price elasticity in his similarit work, using somewhat similar data. Phelps finds a much higher price
elasticity of —0.5. The reconciliation seems to liein the high coltinearity
between income and price in state data. High income states have larger
employment groups and thus lower insurance prices.
I find a strong negative influence of the price of hospital care on the extent
158
IPhelps 159 Iof insurance, with an elasticity, equal to about —0.38. This is the opposite of
what Feldstein (1973) found. The standard error is less than half the estimate
in absolute value. Phelps found essentially no effect when he entered the
price of hospital care in a linear fashion, but a significant effect when he used
a more flexible quadratic formulation. Itried that in my equation, but the
squared term did not do well, in part because of collinearity problems.
Another variable thatI tested was the expected illness, measured by the
average hospital expenditures of the state. There was virtually no effect on
insurance demand. My results, as do Phelps', clearly show that the adverse
selection problem in health insurance is not terribly important. This finding
makes the case for compulsory relatively complete health insurance a more
difficult one to make. This may be the most important finding in all this work.
At this pointIcannot fail to mention that the Blue Cross market share,
holding constant market influences, tends to increase the extent of insurance
held by consumers. This is consistent with the main argument of my work.
Phelps raised the question of how insurers price their product. He believes
that load is roughly proportional to the amount of the expected benefits, but
does not have the necessary data to examine the question. The question is of
some interest since it will certainly affect consumer choice. Information on
insurance pricing might also be useful in evaluating some of the differences
between Blue Cross and commercial insurer behavior. My data allow me to
directly investigate the matter. Following are regressions of per capita
insurance load (LD, LDBC, LDC) on expected benefits (BEN, BENBC, BENC)
for all insurers, Blue Cross insurers, and commercial insurers, respectively.
The equations were estimated across states for 1969. In the overall regres-
sion, BCMSR is also entered to standardize for the lower load of Blue Cross
firms. Both BCMSR and the benefit measures are treated as endogenous
variables.
(2) LD = 21.396 ÷ 0.178 BEN — 39.763 BCMSR n = 41
(3.434)(0.076) (9.414)
(3) LDBC = —4.607 + 0.103 BENBC n = 41
(4.540)(0.032)
(4) LDC =9.657 + 0.216 BENC n = 41
(4.590)(0.072)
The results seem quite reasonable and bear out Phelps' hunches. Much of the
loading charge is proportional to the expected benefits. In the case of Blue
Cross insurance, for which selling expenses are low, the bulk of the loading
charge seems to be proportional.1 A more interesting study, for which I do not
have adequate data, would examine the marginal load for large group
insurance alone. One would expect very low marginal loads and great
similarity between Blue Cross and the commercial insurers.
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sate for me
1.Measurement error in the number of insureds would lead to an upward bias in the marginal toad.
Checking for this by running the regressions in terms of total load, rather than per capita. Iflu mys
showed the problem to be nonexistent for Blue Cross insurance and of minor importance for Without bet
commercial insurance. A more important problem, especially with commercial insurance, is the would point
aggregation of insurance plans with great variation in selling cost, which shows up as load in the world. F





1.Feldstein, M. S., "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, examination
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Carnegie-Mellon University Aside froi
to remove
The paper I am to discuss is a good one, displaying authoritative knowledge correctable
in economic theory, econometrics, and health care. It is entirely appropriate, ties in dete
somewhat unfortunate, that the author should be gaining firsthand knowledge treatment ir
of the health care industry, as well as of the health care insurance industry, care so tha
instead of being able to attend the conference. In our conversation yesterday, correctable
he assured me that his back problem was actually a way of gaining better have to
information about his subject, for which he is to be commended. people wou
The paper is actually two papers. There is a theoretical paper, which looks harm more
at how an individual maximizes utility when confronted with an insurance might begi
policy that has a fixed Coinsurance rate and a maximum payment. There also live with a
is an empirical paper that looks in detail at a 1963 survey and attempts to to impleme
isolate the price and income elasticities of medical care as well as a host of Some
other effects. Public Inter /
It is unfortunate that the two papers are combined. In order to keep the size tions of Co
of the paper down, Phelps has had to skimp on the details in presenting both
, discussion
his theoretical and empirical results. This means that each of them is on the Bay
extremely difficult to understand. The other problem is that, frankly, the need a Me
empirical part of the paper has little or nothing to do with the theoretical part. Mercedes I
For example, insurance is regarded as compensating an individual for the than luxury.
financial penalty of illness in the theoretical part, yet the financial penalty of assume
illness includes not only the payment to providers for medical care received, Dr. Berg C
but also lost income stemming either from absence from work or permanent asymptomi
disability. Although the income in the model is a permanent income, there are
I
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160 Phelpsstill significant losses owing to disability or death; yet, the insurance that he
considers in the empirical part of the paper is merely insurance to compen-
sate for medical expenses. There is no provision for replacing lost income.
I find myself vaguely dissatisfied with the results of the theoretical analysis.
Without being able to pinpoint exactly where the dissatisfaction arises, I
would point out that some of the conclusions seem to contradict what I see in
the world. For example, if an individual is very wealthy, relative to the risk that
he bears, he will insure only if the tax incentives of insuring are greater than
the loading on the insurance policy or if his individual probability of loss
means that the insurance costs less than its actuarial value. Notice that there
are in fact tax breaks that attend the purchase of medical insurance and also
that almost all medical insurance policies are community rather than indi-
vidual rated.It seems to me that these facts are central in any theoretical
examination of the purchase of insurance.
The purpose of insurance is to mitigate the financial loss stemming from an
untoward event. To what extent does an individual (or society) desire to
isolate his wealth from the effects of illness? How far is society willing to go to
ensure that no individual ever has to live with a correctable health problem?
Only the most risk-averse individual would insure so that his wealth was
completely independent of untoward events. However, insofar as society
bears residual responsibility for mitigating the financial and other conse-
quences of disaster, it might choose to increase the incentives to purchase
insurance.
Aside from income redistribution effects, the purpose of health insurance is
to remove any financial barrier that might deter an individual from having a
correctable medical problem treated. Notice that there are a host of difficul-
ties in determining which health states are "correctable," especially since
treatment involves risk. More important, there is no way of rationing medical
care so that it goes only to those people it can help. To get 100 people with
correctable problems who would not currently seek care to seek it, one would
have to lower access and other costs so much that perhaps 5,000 extra
people would seek care. Nor is it obvious that iatrogenic disease would not
harm more than 100 of the 5,000 people induced to seek care. Although it
might be good political rhetoric to declare that no individual shall ever have to
live with a correctable health state, it does not make good sense to attempt
to implement such a platitude.
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Some years ago, Robert Solow and John Kenneth Galbraith argued in the
Public Interest about how competitive the economy was, the welfare implica-
tions of consumer sovereignty, and other matters. Although Ithought the
discussion was amusing, I was struck the day before yesterday while driving
on the Bayshore Freeway by how well Janis Joplin had said it all—Lord, I
need a Mercedes Benz." How much medical care do we need? Unlike the
Mercedes Benz, we presumably believe that medical care is necessity more
than luxury. The theoretical models presented in the papers at this conference
assume that medical care is efficacious and a matter for public concern. As
Dr. Berg commented, some parts of medical care such as screening and
asymptomatic check-ups are of doubtful value; it is equally doubtful that other
161 Demand for Reimbursement InsuranceI.
types of medical care are efficacious on the margin. Would one extra office
visit a year improve health? Thus, I wonder if, on the margin, medical care is
not more palliation than cure.If so, the Grossman investment model that
approaches medical care as restoring the health stock lost to disease (or as
improving the health stock) is true on average, but not on the margin. On the
margin,I equate Joplin's Mercedes Benz with medical care as being pure
consumption. The analogy extends to the unintended harmful effects of each
in the form of accidents and iatrogenic disease.
It behooves us to look not only at what people believe they need, but also at PART
whether they are correctly informed. Medical care is perhaps the extreme
case in which an individual's observations on the amount of care that he
needs are shaped by the providers of that service, It seems to me that we are
misleading ourselves and society by happily grinding away at complicated,
maximum problems that are based on the assumption that medical care is
highly efficacious on the margin. Before we collaborate in pushing expendi-
tures to $200 billion per year,I think we must inquire about whether additional
expenditures on medical care would be effective.
Ihave no quarrel with the empirical contributions of the various papers
presented at this conference. Alas, it seems that policymakers are going to go
ahead with some national health insurance plan whether medical care is
efficacious or not. (My quarrelis with pumping more money into the current
system, not with national health insurance per Se.) The least that we can do for
policymakers in these circumstances is to give them some estimates of the
increased demand that the lower .prices will call forth. Need I add that while
we're giving them these pocitive results, we should continually warn them not
to delude themselves that this additional expenditure on medical care is
other than a U.S-built Mercedes Benz.
162 Phelps